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In the midst of a pandemic, what does it mean to see the Other as Other and not as a carrier 
of the virus? I argue that in seeking a Levinasian response to the pandemic, we must be 
mindful of the implications of the mechanisms of surveillance and control that, presented 
as ways to protect the Other, operate by controlling the Other and rendering our relation to 
the Other increasingly impersonal. Subjected to these mechanisms, the Other becomes a 
dangerous entity that must be controlled, and the state that deploys them comes increasingly 
to mediate the relation between self and Other. The more we rely on such mechanisms for 
protection, the easier it becomes to regard the Other not as one who summons me to an 
infinite responsibility but as a vector of disease. Despite all differences between Levinas’s and 
Foucault’s approaches, reading them in conversation shows that the control and surveillance 
of the population functions within a discourse that medicalizes and objectifies the Other in 
favor of the centralizing power that uses those technologies. In defiance of Levinas’s warning 
against imposing a narrative on the Other’s suffering, this discourse coopts that suffering as 
a justification for biopower. 
Keywords: biopower, Covid-19, disease, ethics, Foucault, Levinas, SARS-CoV-2, surveillance.
1. Introduction
I argue that when evaluating responses to the Covid-19 pandemic in light of Emmanuel Levinas’s ethics, we must be aware that the technologies and procedures that are presented as ways to protect us all – including 
contact tracing, smartphone tracking apps, mask mandates, quarantines, 
lockdowns, enforced social distancing, and vaccine passports  – in fact 
operate by absorbing the Other into a population that must be controlled 
and by rendering the relation to the Other increasingly impersonal. The 
state that deploys these methods in the name of fighting the pandemic 
comes increasingly to mediate the relation between self and Other, and 
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who summons me to an infinite responsibility but as a vector of disease. 
Subjected to these mechanisms that are ostensibly meant to provide 
security, the Other disappears and is replaced by a faceless, dangerous 
entity. Despite the differences between Levinas’s and Michel Foucault’s 
approaches, reading Foucault’s Security, Territory, Population in conver-
sation with certain Levinasian texts, particularly “Useless Suffering,” 
shows that these mechanisms function within a discourse that erases the 
Other in favor of the centralizing state that deploys those mechanisms. 
The stated goal of the mechanisms of control and surveillance that 
many countries have instituted is to protect people against an invisible 
enemy, Covid-19, that endangers everyone. Certainly transmissible 
diseases make clear our interconnectedness: I am not in fact a solitary ego 
but am fundamentally part of a community, whether I like it or not. Thus 
it might seem that Levinasian ethics requires us to adopt these mech-
anisms in order to protect the Other from disease. If I am, as Levinas 
writes, a hostage for the Other, am I not obliged to give up my freedom 
for the Other’s sake? One can, however, invert the question: lockdowns 
and the mechanisms used to enforce them come with costs of their own 
(consider the impact of business closures on people’s livelihoods, the 
impact of isolation on mental health, and the privacy risks of contact 
tracing, tracking apps, and vaccine passports), so dare I compel the Other 
to accept those costs if his or her values differ from mine? With the debate 
over the acceptability of surveillance and control seemingly undecided 
on the ethical plane, that debate then becomes a matter of politics: one 
tries to interpret empirical data about the dangers posed by the virus, by 
lockdowns, and by surveillance technologies, and then one weighs the 
costs and benefits of various courses of action to determine the extent to 
which it is permissible or advisable to surveil and control a population 
in an attempt to end or slow the pandemic. In short, we are faced with 
the classic debate over security versus freedom. What these political cost-
benefit calculations overlook, however, is that no matter how well-inten-
tioned the individuals who institute and enforce it may be, the control of 
populations obscures the face of the Other. When one understands how 
these mechanisms of control operate, I argue, it becomes clear that they 
are themselves anti-ethical. I propose, therefore, to transcend the debate 
over the proper trade-offs between security and freedom by showing how 
the control and surveillance of the population breaks down the ethical 
relation to the Other. Although my argument will have broader implica-
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in the concluding section, my primary focus will be the mechanisms of 
control and surveillance employed in response to Covid-19. 
2. Understanding State Responses to Covid-19 as Exercises of 
Biopower
To understand how the surveillance and control with which many 
governments have responded to Covid-19 is an exercise of biopower, let us 
begin by considering Foucault’s presentation of biopower, at the beginning 
of Security, Territory, Population, as 
the set of mechanisms through which what constitutes the fundamental 
biological features of the human species entered into the world of politics, 
into a political strategy, or, in other words, how society, modern Western 
societies, starting from the eighteenth century, took into account the funda-
mental biological fact that the human being constitutes a human species.1
Biopower, then, refers to the socio-political systems that take the human 
species understood as a biological category, rather than the individual, as 
the object on which they act. The mechanisms of biopower could emerge 
as such only when statistical analysis and the science of biology came to 
appear as the proper lenses through which to understand humans. Under 
the biopolitical regime, the human being is defined strictly as a member 
of a biological species that is to be subject to surveillance2 and control for 
1. Michel Foucault, Sécurité, territoire, population: Cours au Collège de France, 1977-1978 (Paris: 
Seuil/Gallimard, 2004), 3, hereafter STP (Fr); Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the 
Collège de France, 1977-1978, trans. Graham Burchell (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2007), 1, hereafter STP (En), translation modified.
2. It is necessary to briefly clarify the concept of surveillance and its place within the 
biopolitical regime, since Foucault distinguishes between the apparatus [dispositif] of 
security that operates on the population and the disciplinary mechanisms that deal with 
the correction of individuals, and he associates surveillance with the latter. Discipline, 
for Foucault, involves “detective, medical, and psychological techniques […] which 
fall within the domain of surveillance, diagnosis, and the possible transformation of 
individuals” (STP [Fr], 7; STP [En], 5). Surveillance, then, is concerned with humans 
who may be disciplined and shaped as individuals. In contrast, the apparatus of 
security serves fundamentally not to normalize individuals but to see to the health 
and security of the overall population. It does not follow, however, that surveillance 
and other techniques of normalization cease once humans come to be understood 
as members of a biological species. On the contrary, Foucault explicitly states that 
disciplinary mechanisms support the mechanisms of security, which themselves 
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the sake of the population. After all, it is the population and not the indi-
vidual that modern, statistically based science takes as its object – and so 
if this science does indeed offer the most proper and fundamental under-
standing of human beings, then humans are best governed by attending 
not to the training of individuals but to the regulation of the population 
as a whole. Crucially, the population is not even the sum of individuals 
considered in their individuality; on the contrary, “[the multiplicity of 
individuals] is pertinant simply as the instrument, relay, or condition for 
obtaining something at the level of the population.”3 There is no room here 
for the Other to and for whom I am infinitely responsible, with a respon-
sibility that I cannot transfer to anyone else; it is not even a matter of the 
political justice in which I compare the interests of the Other and the third 
party.4 While justice does, for Levinas, oblige me to weigh the interests of 
different people, the ethical obligation remains fundamental: it is because 
the third is also an Other to and for whom I am infinitely responsible 
that I find myself responsible to and for multiple Others who may be in 
conflict. Biopolitics, in contrast, takes its calculations as fundamental, 
and so it cannot reckon with my infinite, incalculable responsibility. From 
the perspective of biopower, the Other, the third, and the self disappear 
into the population – a point the following section and the conclusion will 
guarantee this security one has to appeal, to take just one example, to a whole series 
of techniques for the surveillance of individuals, the diagnosis of what they are, the 
classification of their mental structure, of their specific pathology, and so on; in short 
one has to appeal to a whole disciplinary series that proliferates under mechanisms 
of security and is necessary to make them work” (STP [Fr], 9-10; STP, [En], 7-8). 
Surveillance thus has its place within the biopolitical regime: individuals are surveilled 
so that the security of the population may be better assured. Moreover, surveillance 
has no regard for the face of the Other even within a primarily disciplinary regime, 
as the goal of disciplinary mechanisms is not to care for the Other but to bring each 
person into line with the norm. Certainly, one may attempt to justify surveillance by 
saying that it is best for each person to be thus brought in line, but as this article will 
show, surveillance functions by obscuring the face of the Other even when those who 
practice it claim or believe that surveillance is in people’s best interest.
3. Foucault, STP (Fr), 44; STP (En), 42, translation modified.
4. See Levinas’s observation, in “Philosophy, Justice, and Love,” that “it is always starting 
out from the Face, from the responsibility for the other that justice appears, which calls 
for judgment and comparison, a comparison of what is in principle incomparable, for 
every being is unique; every other is unique” (Emmanuel Levinas, Entre nous: Essais sur 
le penser-à-l’autre [Paris: Grasset, 2016], 114, hereafter ENE; Entre Nous: On Thinking of the 
Other, trans. Michael B. Smith and Barbara Harshav [New York: Columbia University 
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further develop. Biopower operates on the individual only accidentally: its 
real object is the population. 
When considering biopower in general and state responses to Covid-19 
specifically, it is essential to realize that biopower is not an abberation or 
a deviation from what we take to be the state’s ordinary, everyday way of 
functioning. Thus it is not the case that only recognizable abuses of state 
power, such as clear violations of a state’s constitution, are biopolitical. 
The apparatus [dispositif] of security, which takes the population as its 
object, is an operation of biopower whether it is understood as legitimate 
or illegitimate, as constitutional or unconstitutional. Even state decisions 
that may initially seem to be refusals to exercise power are operations of 
biopower: insofar as the contemporary state is a biopolitical one, both its 
actions and its inactions take place as biopower. For instance, the Swedish 
strategy is as much an exercise of biopower as full lockdowns and oblig-
atory smartphone tracking, not only because Sweden has imposed certain 
restrictions (including the closing of high schools and universities, social 
distancing guidelines, limits on the number of people who may gather 
together, and the closing of restaurants and bars that violate these rules) 
but also, and more fundamentally, because the Swedish approach, like 
that of other nation-states, takes for granted that it falls to the governing 
power to devise a strategy for responding to Covid-19 that will produce 
the most satisfactory results for the population considered as an object of 
statistical analysis. The United Kingdom cited expert recommendations to 
justify its shift from a herd immunity approach to a lockdown;5 likewise, 
the Swedish government cited expert recommendations to support its 
decision to not lock down. Indeed, the Swedish strategy was developed 
by the official state epidemiologist, Anders Tegnell – who, what is more, 
has acknowledged that Sweden’s approach is not fundamentally different 
from that of other countries, stating, “To say Sweden acted very different 
[sic] than other countries, that’s not true. We did basically the same as 
many other countries. We did it in a slightly different way.”6 Indeed. What 
5. See Mark Landler and Stephen Castle, “Behind the Virus Report that Jarred the U.S. 
and the U.K. to Action,” The New York Times, March 17, 2020, updated April 2, 2020, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/17/world/europe/coronavirus-imperial-college-
johnson.html.
6. Quoted in Teri Schulz, “Do Sweden’s COVID liberties cost lives?” Deutsche Welle, April 
21, 2021, https://www.dw.com/en/do-swedens-covid-liberties-cost-lives/a-57268022. 
The article goes on to say that “[Tegnell] suggests that what Sweden has tried to do, 
in contrast with other countries, is to pinpoint ‘what we need to close down where 
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is at stake, in these different responses to Covid-19, are differing interpre-
tations of the data, while the implicit claim that the data call for a response 
by the governing state power is undisputed and scarcely acknowledged. 
In Sweden as in the U.K., Norway, Denmark, and other countries that 
locked down, the state has assumed the authority to determine how best 
to manage the population in an attempt to ensure its health – physical, 
mental, and economic. 
Indeed, ensuring the health of the population is the great aim of the 
biopolitical regime. In “The Politics of Health in the Eighteenth Century,” 
Foucault observes that in the 18th century we see “the emergence of the 
health and physical well-being of the population in general as one of the 
essential objectives of political power. […] The imperative of health – at 
once the duty of each and the objective of all.”7 Unsurprisingly, then, the 
biopolitical state takes a considerable interest in epidemics – and as we 
will see over the course of this article, epidemics are not an exception to 
that state’s standard operations, for biopower treats the population itself 
as an epidemic. It was also in the 18th century, as Foucault explains in 
Security, Territory, Population, that epidemics came to be understood for 
the first time in terms of statistical analysis and of calculations of risk for 
different sectors of the population;8 for the first time as well the increase, 
through contagion, in the number of cases of a disease came to be under-
stood as a crisis that “can only be checked either by a higher, natural 
mechanism, or by an artificial mechanism.”9 These analyses and inter-
ventions are understood to be the business of a centralized power, and 
so the management of epidemics, as well as the managing of famines, 
contributes to “the integration of the town within central mechanisms of 
power, or better, the inversion that made the town the primary problem, 
government only has a temporary legal  right to impose a lockdown if it deems it 
necessary – something it has not done” (ibid.). The basic principle that the governing 
power should consult experts to determine what sectors of society ought to shut down, 
and that it should then shut those sectors down, is, however, as well established in 
Sweden as it is elsewhere. It is true that the Swedish state faces, in this regard, greater 
constitutional restrictions than other states do, but the principle that the state must 
respond to Covid-19 remains.
7. Michel Foucault, “La politique de la santé au XVIIIe siècle,” in Dits et écrits, 1954-1988, 
vol. 3, 1976-1979, ed. Daniel Defert and François Ewald with Jacques Lagrange (Paris: 
Gallimard, 1994), 16; “The Politics of Health in the Eighteenth Century,” trans. Robert 
Hurley, in The Essential Works of Foucault, 1954-1988, vol. 3, Power, ed. James D. Faubion 
(New York: The New Press, 2001), 94.
8. Foucault, STP (Fr); 62-63; STP (En), 60-61.
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even before the problem of the territory.”10 The enemy is not only external, 
nor is the enemy only some definite internal group; rather, the population 
as a whole is understood as a danger to itself. The population must be 
controlled so that it can be protected from itself. Certainly, this emphasis 
on the population itself as dangerous may and often does coexist alongside 
the exclusion of foreigners or of particular subgroups of the population. 
Consider, for instance, the attempt to force international students to leave 
the United States if their universities opted for online-only classes (a policy 
that was ultimately rescinded, without being implemented, when Harvard 
University and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology filed a lawsuit to 
overturn it).11 The population, then, is understood to be threatened both 
by those who are perceived as outsiders and by itself as a whole. 
In the biopolitical state, the exclusion of foreigners, the oppression 
of particular groups of citizens, and the control of the entire population 
are all presented as ways to secure the population from supposed threats 
rather than as ways to preserve the ruler’s sovereignty. The “problem” at 
hand is 
no longer that of fixing and demarcating the territory, but of allowing circula-
tions to take place, of controlling them, sifting the good and the bad, ensuring 
that things are always in movement, constantly moving around, continually 
going from one point to another, but in such a way that the inherent dangers 
of this circulation are anulled. No longer the safety (sûreté) of the Prince and 
his territory, but the security (sécurité) of the population and, consequently, 
of those who govern it.12 
Here Foucault could have been describing 21st-century governmental 
responses to the Covid-19 pandemic. The aim of these responses is precisely 
to control the circulation of people to eliminate “the inherent dangers of 
this circulation.” Lockdowns and quarantines restrict circulation with 
the promise that only in this way can circulation be made safe again at 
some indeterminate future moment. Contact tracing and tracking apps 
monitor circulation on the grounds that such monitoring is necessary to 
reduce the dangers of circulation to an acceptable level; again, the length 
of time during which such techniques will be necessary is unspecified, 
10. Foucault, STP (Fr), 66; STP, (En), 64.
11. See Elizabeth Redden, “Government Rescinds International Student Policy,” 
Inside Higher Ed, July 15, 2020, https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2020/07/15/
trump-administration-drops-directive-international-students-and-online-courses. 
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and it is often unclear what level of risk is deemed acceptable. It is true 
that some lockdowns have been announced for a specific period of time 
and have indeed been lifted at the end of that period of time: to take one 
example, the recent lockdown of Perth and Peel in Western Australia was 
set for three days – from 12:01 am, April 24, 2021 to 12:01 am, April 27, 
2021 – and was in fact lifted at 12:01 am, April 27, 2021.13 What remains 
unknown, however, is how often Australian state governments will 
impose lockdowns and when the last one will occur. On one level, it is 
obvious that no governing power in any country can possibly predict with 
certainty when risk levels will decrease to a point it would consider wholly 
acceptable, whether that point is zero Covid cases or some unspecified 
minimum level of viral circulation. More profoundly, though, there can be 
no true end to the present state of emergency – nor did it genuinely begin 
with Covid-19 – because the danger that is to be minimized is posed by the 
population itself. There is no such thing as a risk level that the governing 
power would consider wholly acceptable, for the risk is precisely the circu-
lation of the population – and that risk is always potentially unacceptable, 
since its potential unacceptability is the justification for the state’s exercise 
of biopower. Biopower justifies itself, that is, by the implicit claim that the 
population must be subject to certain controls so that the danger it poses 
to itself will not become too great.
In other words, the reason it is unspecified how long the mechanisms 
of surveillance and control will remain in place is not only, and not funda-
mentally, because we are unable to calculate when the pandemic will end. 
It is because this surveillance is not, as we are often urged to believe, an 
exceptional response to an exceptional problem. It is crucial to understand 
the implications of the fact that the above quotation from Foucault does 
not refer to the Covid-19 pandemic, even though, as I observed, it seems to 
have been written for the present moment: these mechanisms that states 
have deployed did not emerge from nowhere but are inscribed within 
the existing operations of biopower, and so state responses to Covid-19 
cannot be understood independently of broader considerations of state 
power. Recall here that the governing power works to preserve itself: the 
“security” that is at stake is, as the above quotation indicates, that “of the 
population and, consequently, of those who govern it.” The population 
13. See “Perth metro and Peel to enter a 3-day lockdown,” WA.gov.au, April 23, 2021, https://
www.wa.gov.au/government/announcements/perth-metro-and-peel-enter-3-day-
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must be constantly threatened so that power can operate to preserve itself. 
The constant operation of biopower works to protect the population from 
the threat that the population poses to itself; therefore the population is 
constantly threatened. To put it another way, biopower operates by first 
constituting the population as a threat in order to then protect it from 
that threat. Indeed, the population exists only as a threat: the population 
simply is that which for its own safety is subject to measurements, calcu-
lations, and controls that operate on the level of the group rather than of 
the individual.14 Without those measurements, calculations, and controls, 
a population would not be a population but would only be a group of indi-
viduals. And this analysis holds regardless of the motives or ultimate fate 
of any individual in the government. Once a system has been set in motion, 
one cannot escape that system simply by electing different people to sit at 
the top of it. Individual politicians may fall from grace when constituents 
object to the extent or manner of their exercise of their powers, but the 
biopolitical regime remains as long as there is a state that acts on the 
14. Considering that the population itself is the threat, it is interesting to note that, while 
justifications for the mechanisms of control enforced during the Covid-19 pandemic 
tend to present their use as a matter of scientific necessity, the pandemic has often 
been described as a war. Announcing a countrywide lockdown, French president 
Emmanuel Macron repeatedly stated, “Nous sommes en guerre [We are at war],” and 
he called for a “mobilisation générale [general mobilization]” (Alexandre Lemarié and 
Cédric Pietralunga, “« Nous sommes en guerre  »  : face au coronavirus, Emmanuel 
Macron sonne la « mobilisation générale »,” Le Monde, March 17, 2020, https://www.
lemonde.fr/politique/article/2020/03/17/nous-sommes-en-guerre-face-au-coronavirus-
emmanuel-macron-sonne-la-mobilisation-generale_6033338_823448.html). British 
prime minister Boris Johnson said that his government had taken “steps that 
are unprecedented since World War II” and said, “[W]e must act like any wartime 
government and do whatever it takes to support our economy” (Boris Johnson, “Prime 
Minister’s statement on coronavirus (COVID-19): 17 March 2020,” Gov.uk, March 17, 
2020, https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pm-statement-on-coronavirus-17-
march-2020). American president Donald Trump said, “I view it as, in a sense, a wartime 
president” (Caitlyn Oprysko and Susannah Luthi, “Trump labels himself ‘a wartime 
president’ combating coronavirus,” Politico, March 18, 2020, https://www.politico.com/
news/2020/03/18/trump-administration-self-swab-coronavirus-tests-135590). New 
York governor Andrew Cuomo said, “Ventilators are to this war what missiles were to 
World War II” (“‘We Are All in Quarantine’: 100% of NY Work Force Must Stay Home, 
Cuomo Puts State on Pause,” NBC New York, March 20, 2020, updated March 22, 2020, 
https://www.nbcnewyork.com/news/coronavirus/nyc-hospitals-weeks-from-running-
out-of-supplies-as-death-toll-soars/2335762/”). And these are only a few examples. 
The language of war functions to conceal the biopolitical control of the population by 
casting us not as members of a population that is itself the threat but rather as soldiers 
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population. Even if all restrictions justified by the pandemic are eventually 
rolled back, the system within which they were instituted will still stand.
Indeed, techniques of control and surveillance have long been 
absorbing the Other into the abstraction of “the population” and 
teaching us to understand the population as a source of danger – while 
presenting themselves as obviously necessary measures. In the United 
States, one may think of the increased surveillance in airports following 
the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, which is not only an attempt 
to secure territory against a foreign enemy but which also functions to 
control the population and its circulation  – though, again, surveillance 
long predates the Transportation Security Administration (TSA). As 
noted above, biopower aims to guarantee the health of the population: 
Foucault points out that in Europe public health has been an object of the 
police since the establishment of the modern state, and not only during 
epidemics; indeed, the entire organization of the city “will be ordered by, 
subordinated to principles, to concerns of health: the width of roads, the 
dispersion of elements that may produce miasmas and poison the atmo-
sphere, butchers, abattoirs, cemeteries.”15 The TSA certainly has vocal 
critics – though critiques often state that it is ineffective rather than ques-
tioning biopower itself  – but it may seem obvious that cities should be 
designed in accord with “concerns of health.” As also noted above, even 
critics of lockdowns may take for granted that the state should concern 
itself with the health of the population, while simply arguing that lock-
downs fail to preserve the population’s health or are actively detrimental 
to it. The apparent obviousness of the notion that the state should seek to 
ensure the health of the population is part and parcel of the functioning 
of biopower, which justifies itself by presenting its operations as natural. 
As Foucault explains later in his analysis, “the mechanism of security […] 
connects to what the physiocrats called physical processes, which could 
be called natural processes, and which we could also call elements of 
reality.”16 Biopower operates because it ostensibly must: thus “the popu-
lation as a collection of subjects is replaced by the population as a set of 
natural phenomena.”17 The idea that science prescribes the correct policy 
for governments to follow in responding to Covid-19 is, therefore, itself 
part of the system of biopower. Edward McGushin accurately summarizes 
15. Foucault, STP (Fr), 332; STP (En), 325, translation modified.
16. Foucault, STP (Fr), 67; STP (En), 65-66, translation modified.
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the biopolitical pursuit of health when he writes that in the biopolitical 
state, “the social body is conceived very concretely as a medical body, 
and doctors are the ones who can heal. They have the task of outlining a 
politics of health.”18 These sentences also could have been written about 
the Covid-19 pandemic – but they were not, and the fact that they were not 
reminds us that state responses to Covid-19 are not unusual responses to 
an unprecedented emergency but have arisen within and from the estab-
lished systems of biopower. If it seems obvious that we should let experts 
determine public health policy, during the Covid-19 pandemic and in 
general, that is because we have already implicitly accepted the principle 
that the state should seek to promote the health of the population. 
3. How the Operations of Biopower Obscure the Face of the Other
Having examined the operations of biopower in the context of the 
Covid-19 pandemic, I now return to Levinas to argue that, in defiance of 
Levinas’s warning against imposing a narrative on the Other’s suffering, 
the mechanisms of control that states have imposed coopt that suffering 
as a justification for the operations of biopower. I have already noted 
that biopower absorbs the Other into the population and that this is 
no accident but is essential to the functioning of biopower. Let us now 
consider more directly the biopolitical narrative about risk and suffering: 
whose suffering, exactly, does biopower operate to prevent? No one’s, for 
biopower operates on the population, an abstract entity that is the object 
of statistical analysis and calculation. The claim that we must weigh the 
harm caused by Covid-19 against the harm caused by lockdowns and 
the risks posed by surveillance technologies and increased government 
control may at first appear easy to dismiss on the grounds that human life 
is infinitely valuable and not subject to calculation – which is a Levinasian 
point. Yet the endorsement of the control and surveillance of the popu-
lation on the grounds that we must minimize Covid-19 deaths at all costs 
is equally a calculation from which the face of the Other is absent. 
As I stated in the introduction to this article, my aim here is not to 
discuss the question of security versus freedom or to embark on a prac-
tical analysis of the likelihood that any particular state government will 
use the mechanisms of control and surveillance that it has put in place, 
18. Edward McGushin, Foucault’s Askēsis: An Introduction to the Philosophical Life (Evanston: 
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such as contact tracing and cell phone tracking, for purposes other 
than responding directly to the Covid-19 pandemic. By challenging the 
discourse of security, by which these mechanisms are justified, on the 
grounds of ethics as understood by Levinas, I avoid the trap of criticizing 
that discourse in the name of a freedom that derives its sense only from 
the discourse of security itself. Foucault observes that “an apparatus of 
security, in any case the one I have spoken about, cannot operate well 
except on condition that it is given freedom, in the modern sense [the 
word] acquires in the eighteenth century: no longer the exemptions and 
privileges attached to a person, but the possibility of movement, change 
of place, and processes of circulation of both people and things.”19 The 
point is not that circulation is irrelevant to freedom; rather, the point is 
that freedom comes to be defined strictly in relation to the apparatus of 
security. Freedom becomes that which the apparatus of security osten-
sibly secures: the governing power controls the circulation of the popu-
lation so that the population may be free to circulate without harming 
itself. The question whether there should be fewer restrictions on circu-
lation, or none at all, therefore readily transforms into the question of 
how many restrictions are needed to properly secure the circulation of the 
population. We then find ourselves debating, not the discourse of security 
itself, but rather a tradeoff that takes place entirely within the terms set 
by the discourse of security. For the discourse of security does not deny 
that circulation is a good. Even positing circulation as an absolute good 
still accepts the terms of the discourse of security in that it is a calculation 
about what is most beneficial for the population.
Levinasian ethics transcends the discourse of security, and the 
attendant debate over security versus freedom, because it responds to the 
Other rather than entering into calculations about the population. The 
operations of biopower and the discourse of security that justifies them 
inherently fail to recognize that, as Levinas puts it in “Useless Suffering,” 
“the suffering in the other […] is unforgiveable to me.”20 What the control 
and surveillance that operate on the population obscure is precisely what 
Levinas calls “the recourse that people have to one another for help, before 
the astonishing alterity of the other has been banalized or dimmed down 
to a simple exchange of good manners [bons procédés] that has become 
19. Foucault, STP (Fr), 50; STP (En), 48-49, brackets and bracketed words in original.
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established as an ‘interpersonal commerce’ of customs.”21 For the mecha-
nisms of security never operate on the Other at all – nor even on the self. 
My responsibility to recognize the Other’s suffering as unforgiveable does 
not matter in biopolitics; neither does the Other’s suffering or the Other’s 
call to me. One cannot even say that the relation to the Other has become 
an “exchange of good manners” or “good processes,” since in surveillance 
there is no relation to the Other. Through the operations of biopower, a 
faceless state controls a faceless population, ostensibly for the sake of the 
population and so for the sake of no person at all.22
The Other’s suffering is thus co-opted for a narrative that justifies the 
mechanisms of security – that reinforces, that is, the power of the faceless 
state. Hence the Other’s suffering is no longer recognized as senseless but 
is taken to mean that the centralizing power of the state must act to protect 
the population with which we identify ourselves  – even though it is, in 
truth, a statistical abstraction to which we are wholly incidental. If the 
stories of the suffering Other did not reinforce the operations of biopower, 
they would be left untold or would be explained away. The Other’s appeal 
to me is silenced, and my very responsibility is negated: both are irrelevant 
to the control and surveillance of the population, and so the surveillance 
does not see them and the control disregards them. But that which cannot 
be surveilled and controlled has no reality, as far as biopower is concerned. 
Reality is summed up in the population and the danger it poses to itself – 
and if it were not the Covid-19 virus it would be something else since, as 
explained in the previous section, the population is inherently a threat. 
Whether or not there is a literal epidemic occuring, there is always some 
contagion by which surveillance can justify itself, for the population itself 
is the contagion. We are not soldiers in a war against Covid-19, far from 
it: as far as the operations of biopower are concerned, we ourselves are 
Covid-19. The face of the Other is transformed into an abstract carrier of 
21. Levinas, ENE, 111; ENT, 101, translation modified.
22. Mask requirements are particularly interesting in light of this obscuring of the face 
of the Other. It is true that ethical recognition of the Other does not depend on seeing 
his or her literal face. To take an example that is unrelated to the current discussions 
of Covid-19, one skier may recognize another as the Other even if both are concealing 
their faces against the cold. Yet the discourse of security within which the mask 
requirement finds its sense does obscure the Other’s face in the Levinasian sense of the 
word. The mask, as one of the mechanisms by which the governing power controls the 
population, does stand for a discourse that places itself between self and Other in order 
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the virus, much as, in the case of post-9/11 airport security in the United 
States, the face is transformed into an abstract potential terrorist.23 
To fully grasp the relevance of “Useless Suffering” to this discussion 
of biopower, it is crucial to understand that theodicy ultimately serves less 
to justify God than to justify ourselves. The notion that others’ suffering 
is ultimately meaningful, states Levinas, “is the grand idea necessary to 
the inner peace of souls in our distressed world.”24 When we claim to have 
proven that God is not responsible for evil because evil is part of some 
grand plan and therefore, in the final analysis, serves the good, we are 
really saying that we ourselves are innocent: we did not need to intervene 
because the grand plan ensures that the evil and our own inaction will 
work out for good. Levinas’s rejection of theodicy does not blame God 
for evil and suffering; it blames us and commands us to fight them. The 
discourse of security functions, however, as a theodicy without God: it tells 
us that human suffering is subject to calculation and that we ourselves are 
not responsible for it as long as we do what we are told the calculations 
command. Whatever suffering still occurs is the fault of those who refused 
to obey the calculations, or else it is acceptable, according to those same 
calculations. And, as noted, that suffering serves to justify the orders we 
are given on the basis of the calculations. Suffering, then, takes on various 
meanings: it is the price we must pay to ensure that certain other interests 
are met (thus harm from Covid-19 and harm from lockdowns are traded 
against each other), it is a sign that some are disobeying orders and must 
therefore be punished, and, above all, it is a sign that we must submit to 
the governing power that knows better than we do how to calculate what 
degrees of suffering and what sources of suffering are acceptable.
It is true that an individual person may well submit to contact tracing, 
download a tracking app, and obey lockdown restrictions out of a sincere 
desire to care for the Other. As we have already seen, however, the func-
tioning of biopower, in its various manifestations, does not depend on 
individual motivations. One might ask whether this independence from 
individual motives is not a good thing: may it not be the case that, at least 
23. Certainly not everyone is perceived as a threat, or as worthy of protection, to the same 
degree, but ending discrimination in the operations of biopower would not lead to every 
person being recognized as the Other to whom I am responsible, since those operations 
do not and cannot acknowledge the Other at all. Note that it is not that the individuals 
within a system view every person whom they encounter as a threat; a TSA agent may, for 
instance, encounter nobody whom she consciously or unconsciously fears is a terrorist. 
The point is that the system itself constitutes each person as a threat.
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in some instances, biopower forces people to act for the good of the Other 
whether they want to or not, and then may biopower not serve the Other? 
This question utterly misunderstands biopower, however. If on some 
occasion biopower operates in a way that is, on balance, genuinely good 
for people, that is a coincidence. Indeed, the person who accepts control 
and surveillance because she wishes to serve the Other does so in spite 
of the principles by which the mechanisms of control and surveillance 
operates. This is so because biopower interposes the governing power 
between the self and the Other. Moreover, in justifying itself by presenting 
itself as natural, biopower further excludes the ethical, which is more 
fundamental than the really or apparently natural. As Levinas states in 
“Humanism and An-Archy,” my responsibility to the Other is an-archic 
because it is “prior to Being and beings, not saying itself in ontological 
categories.”25 The legitimacy of the biopolitical depends on a denial of 
this an-archy. For biopower takes itself as the arché, the origin or first 
principle. It cannot be conditioned by ethics because it acts only on the 
population and cannot hear the call of the Other.
4. Conclusion: Risking a Just Politics
We cannot in practice exist purely within the ethical realm; we 
must, though it is strictly speaking impossible, calculate and compare the 
interests of the Other and the third.26 It remains, however, that the biopo-
litical state is not the just state of which Levinas does speak favorably. In 
25. Emmanuel Levinas, Humanisme de l’autre homme (Paris: Fata Morgana, 1987), 91; Humanism 
of the Other, trans. Nidra Poller (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2003), 57.
26. Recall Levinas’s statement that “it is always starting out from the Face, from the 
responsibility for the other that justice appears, which calls for judgment and 
comparison, a comparison of what is in principle incomparable, for every being is 
unique; every other is unique” (ENE, 114; ENT, 104). And as he writes elsewhere, “The 
third party is other than the neighbor, but also another neighbor, and also a neighbor 
of the other, and not simply his fellow. […] Justice is necessary, that is, comparison, 
coexistence, contemporaneousness, assembling, order, thematization, the visibility of 
faces, and thus intentionality and the intellect, and in intentionality and the intellect, 
the intelligibility of a system, and thence also a copresence on an equal footing as 
before a court of justice” (Emmanuel Levinas, Autrement qu’être ou au-delà de l’essence 
[Paris: Kluwer Academic, 2011], 245; Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, trans. 
Alphonso Lingis [Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 2006], 157). The third party 
is also an Other, and so I am responsible to and for both the Other and the third – yet 
their interests may conflict, or one may act with violence against the other, and so their 
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“Philosophy, Justice, and Love,” for instance, he writes that “there is a 
possible harmony between ethics and the state. The just state will come 
from just men and women and saints rather than from propaganda and 
preaching.”27 Nor will it come from the operations of biopower  – since 
biopower has no place for “just men and women and saints” but only for 
the abstract population. Rather, working out how humans may live in a 
just community is the project of a lifetime for all of us: justice will come 
only through each one of us striving to be just. And it is much easier to 
say what justice is not than to say what it is; how could it be otherwise if 
justice is not to forget the an-archic call of the Other that precedes every 
supposedly first principle? Because justice must always be referred to the 
call that exceeds my comprehension, it cannot be set forth in a program.
A key problem resulting from the operations of biopower is, unsur-
prisingly, a crisis of trust: the more natural it seems to submit to control 
and surveillance by a centralized state that exists to secure the popu-
lation against threats, the easier it becomes to see each other person as an 
incarnation of the threat that is the population, and the harder dialogue 
becomes. Ernst Wolff warns that because Levinasian ethics is an-archic 
and therefore cannot tell us exactly how justice is to be lived out, a 
Levinasian politics “carries in it the danger of being a politics of the war 
of every citizen’s notion of justice against that of the others.”28 The only 
way to avoid intractable conflict between different conceptions of justice 
is precisely dialogue among those who are committed to seeking justice – 
but the more we see each other as a threat, the less we are willing to trust 
that others are indeed committed to seeking justice. The path toward this 
necessary dialogue must involve a radical questioning of the operations 
of biopower that separate us from each other by absorbing us into the 
abstraction of the population. 
Crucially, this radical questioning demands that we risk error. For 
although justice must calculate, no calculations tell us what justice is. 
Madeleine Fagan rightly points out that there is never, for Levinas, a 
purely ethical relation of only self and Other into which the third then 
enters; we are always already within the political. She concludes that “the 
consequences of approaching Levinas’s thought as refusing to provide a 
pure vision of ethics or responsibility, of foregrounding his argument that 
27. Levinas, ENE, 131; ENT, 120.
28. Ernst Wolff, “The Quest for Justice versus the Rights of the Other?” Sofia Philosophical 
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the Third is present even in the face of the Other in the face-to-face mean 
that Levinas cannot be used to provide an ethical ground, so returning 
us once again to the risk and uncertainty which may allow for responsi-
bility.”29 Indeed. To be responsible is to bear the risk of uncertainty and 
error. From the perspective of ethics, a great lie of biopower is its promise 
to secure the population against error through calculations that tell us 
what risks to run and how much risk is acceptable, thereby freeing us not 
only from responsibility for the Other’s suffering but also from responsi-
bility for judging the interests of the Other and the third. Controlled, we 
are responsible for nothing: we do not ourselves bear the weight of the 
difficult and uncertain quest for justice, for judging different interests is 
not our task but that of the biopolitical state. Questioning the operations 
of biopower means, therefore, questioning the very notions of securing 
the population and reducing risk. Where this questioning may lead us is 
necessarily uncertain. If we wish to live in a just community, however, 
we must embark on this questioning of biopower and of its promise of 
security – and we must do so even and especially in a time of pandemic 
when it is all too easy to accept the operations of biopower as natural. 
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